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COURT OF APPEALS OPINIQN 
The Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision was ordered not 
published. That decision granted the Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Disposition and summarily affirmed the trial court's 
order (Appendix 1). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The statement of the case is succinctly set forth in the 
Memorandum Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals and reiterated 
verbatim: 
"Dopp filed a paternity proceeding alleging that Olch 
was the father of her child. Olch disputed the 
allegations of paternity. In February of 1980/ Olch and 
Dopp, individually and "as guardian ad litem" for her 
child, entered into a stipulation for settlement which 
provided for a lump sum settlement of all claims as to 
paternity, expenses of pregnancy, any education and 
support expenses, inheritance rights and any claim 
otherwise related to the allegations of the pleadings or 
subject matter of the litigation. The Settlement 
Agreement contained an express disclaimer of paternity 
and a waiver of any rights to the child. Finally the 
Agreement contained the following language regarding 
disposition of the litigation: 
5. 'Both parties agree not to initiate any 
communications with the other party or members of 
their family.' 
6. 'The parties agree that upon payment of the 
entire $16,500.00 and any accrued interest, the 
above-entitled action shall be dismissed with 
prejudice and upon the merits, each party to bear 
his or her own costs.' 
7. 'This agreement is conditioned upon approval of 
the Court where the above-entitled action is 
pending and a dismissal with prejudice of said 
action.' 
The document also contained an 'Order' which recited 
that the Court approve the Agreement of Settlement, and 
that the matter was continued without date. The Order 
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further provided 'the Defendant shall submit to the 
Court an Order of Dismissal upon final payment of the 
amounts referred to in the foregoing Agreement of 
Settlement." The Order was signed on February 19, 1980 
and filed on the same day. 
On January 27, 1981, Dopp's counsel filed a Satisfaction 
of Judgment acknowledging receipt of the settlement 
amount and authorizing and directing the Court to enter 
satisfaction. Although not conforming with the express 
direction of the February 19, 1980 Order to prepare an 
Order of Dismissal, the Satisfaction of Judgment was 
clearly intended to culminate the paternity action. 
In or about June of 1987, Olch caused an Order to Show 
Cause to be issued requiring Dopp to appear and show why 
she should not be held in contempt for initiating 
communication with Olch and his family. The Court 
declined to hold Dopp in contempt, but ordered that: 
'It was the intent of the parties that no 
communication be instigated between them or their 
families and the Court now enters this Order that 
neither party shall communicate with the other or 
their families in any way, whether such 
communication be written or verbal, or through 
utilizing third parties.' 
Dopp subsequently brought a Motion to Dismiss with 
Prejudice and in the alternative, a Motion to Amend 
Decree to allow for communication between the minor 
child, Olch and his family. Both Motions were denied. 
Dopp appealed, contending that the trial court erred in 
"sua sponte" entering an order of no communication, in 
refusing to dismiss the case, in not amending the 
'Decree' based on 'changed circumstances, and in denying 
appellant attorney's fees." 
The Order to Show Cause was personally served upon Kathy 
Dopp on May 22, 1987 (Appendix 2). The original hearing date was 
continued at the request of the Appellant's counsel and she later 
appeared in person and with counsel at the hearing on June 29, 
1987 (Appellant's Petition, Appendix 3). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF LACKS ACCURACY AND 
CLARITY AND MUST BE DISMISSED ON ITS FACE 
Petitioner's Brief is inaccurate and does not clarify issues 
sufficiently to allow determination that review is appropriate in 
this case, R. Utah S.Ct. No* 46(e)* 
The Appellant states there has been no determination as to 
paternity in this case, yet the District Court approved a 
settlement which was signed by Ms. Dopp in 1980 (Appendix 3) and 
entered an Order that Jonathan Olch was not the father of 
Petitioner's child. Satisfaction of Judgment was filed by Ms. 
Dopp's lawyer in January, 1981 (Appendix 4). The validity of 
that Order was not challenged for eight years. It was later 
upheld at the Order to Show Cause (Petitioner's Brief, Appendix 
4) and by the Court of Appeals (Appendix 1). 
Petitioner asserts vague claims, without authority to 
support them, that she did not receive adequate notice of the 
Order to Show Cause (Petitioner's Brief pp. 4,5). The Order to 
Show Cause (Appendix 2) reflects it was personally served upon 
her on May 22, 1987 and sets forth the purpose of the hearing as 
an inquiry regarding violation of the Court Order of February 19, 
1980; "that you not contact the Defendant or members of his 
family". Thereafter Petitioner appeared with her attorney at the 
hearing. The Court of Appeals found this argument to be "wholly 
without merit" (Court of Appeals, Opinion, pg. 3, Appendix 1). 
The Petition does not adequately or clearly describe what 
the Petitioner wants or any authority requiring review. 
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II. 
THE FACTUAL HISTORY AND SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS CLEARLY 
INDICATES THAT REVIEW IS UNNECESSARY 
It is important to emphasize that the Court of Appeals 
carefully reviewed the factual history of this case prior to 
deciding that it should be summarily dismissed without the filing 
of briefs. 
The paternity action was filed over eight years ago and 
disputed by Mr, Olch. That proceeding was settled and the 
settlement approved by the Court and required by § 78-45(a)-13 
U.C.A. (1953, amended 1965). Both parties signed the Stipulation 
(Appendix 3) eight years ago. 
In conformance with the Settlement Agreement and the Order 
of the Courtf Ms. Dopp filed a complete and full Satisfaction of 
Judgment in January, 1981. (See Appendix 4). As part of that 
Stipulation and Order Ms. Dopp was "not to initiate any 
communication with the other party or members of their family" 
(Appendix 3). The Order to Show Cause only requested that she 
comply with her stipulation and agreement and not harass Mr. 
Olch. Judge Sawaya did not find Ms. Dopp in contempt of court, 
but simply issued an order that she live up to her earlier 
stipulation and the ensuing Order that she not harass Mr. Olch 
and his family (Appendix 5). 
Besides the rules of this Court, the Petitioner relies upon 
general references to the XIV Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States and the due process clause of the Constitution 
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of Utah, Article 1, Section 7 (Petitioner's Brief, p. ii). Also, 
in addition, three statutes are cited as authority, though none 
of them are referred to in the argument (Petitioner's Brief, p. 
2). Those statutes are irrelevant and not dispositive of any of 
the issues urged for consideration. 
The first statute describes the discretionary nature of 
review of this Court in considering the Petition, § 78-2-2(5) 
U.C.A. (1953, amended 1986). 
The second statute has nothing to do with this case at 
all. It is the title section of the Utah Exemptions Act, §78-23-
1 U.C.A 1953, amended 1981). 
The third statute deals with attorney's fees in an action 
commenced in bad faith, § 78-27-56 U.C.A. (1953, amended 1981). 
In addition to the aforementioned, while not referred to in 
Petitioner's Table of Authorities, the Brief also sets forth § 
78-45A-1 et seq. , U.C.A. (1953) as being applicable to this 
case. None of those sections are referred to in the Brief. That 
section of the Utah Code is the Uniform Action Paternity under 
which the original action was commenced in 1979. Petitioner does 
not contend there is any provision of that Act which is now 
applicable. 
III. 
RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THIS APPEAL. 
Respondent respectfully requests this Court consider the 
appropriateness of an award of attorney's fees as provided by 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and § 78-27-56 
U.C.A. (1953, amended). 
It would appear that the Petitioner has prosecuted this 
appeal more for the purposes of harassing Mr. Olch, than 
addressing any actual controversy. The parties resolved their 
differences approximately eight years ago. Mr. Olch paid Ms. 
Dopp the sum of $16,000.00 and a complete Satisfaction of 
Judgment was entered by her attorney. Eight years later she 
commenced contacting and harassing Mr. Olch in direct violation 
of an agreement she made and which was adopted and approved by 
the District Court Judge. 
Mr. Olch requested the assistance of the District Court in 
encouraging Ms. Dopp to obey the earlier agreement. This request 
was upheld, not only by the District Court but on summary review 
by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner now comes before this Court 
asking it to review the appropriateness of the other Orders 
without citing any substantive authority. 
This case was resolved eight years ago and the sole 
objective in these appeals by Ms. Dopp is to obtain legal 
sanctions for the right to harass the Respondent. There is no 
other relief which can be afforded her nor has any other relief 
ultimately been requested either in this Court or the court 
below. 
The Respondent would submit this is an appropriate 
circumstance for an award of attorneyfs fees in favor of the 
Respondent for the continued bad faith prosecution of these 
appeals. 
- 6 -
CONCLUSION 
Respondent requests this Court that the Petition filed by 
Kathy Ann Dopp be denied and Respondent be awarded his costs and 
attorney's fees for this appeal and that which was perfected to 
the Court of Appeals. 
DATED this ) f day of March, 1988. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct copy of 
the foregoing BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI by United States first-class mail, postage prepaid, to 
Robert Hansen, Attorney at Law, 320 South Fifth East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84102 on the / / day of namely 1988.^ 
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APPENDIX 
Utah Court of Appeals Decision, Kathy Ann Dopp v. 
Jonathan Olchy Case No. 87-572CA (1988) 
Order to Show Case dated Hay 15, 1987 
Agreement of Settlement and and Ord^r Approving 
Settlement 
Satisfaction of Judgment 
Order of the District Court Sought to be Reviewed 
Statutes -
§ 78-2-2(5) U.C.A. (1953) 
§ 78-23-1 U.C.A. (1953) 
§ 78-27-56 U.C.A. (1953) 
1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAL^ 
ooOoo 
Kathy Ann Dopp# 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Jonathan Olch, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
FILED 
JAN 61988 
Timothy M.Shw 
. C t a * erf too Court 
"ten u*ur t of Appeals 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not for Publication) 
Case ^o. 870572-CA 
Before Judges Davidson, Garff and Greenwood (On Law and Motion), 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary 
Disposition of appellant Kathy Ann Dopp (hereinafter HDoppM) 
and on the Motion for Summary Disposition and Response of 
respondent Jonathan Olch (hereinafter "01chM). We grant the 
motion made by Olch and summarily affirm the trial court*s 
order. 
Dopp filed a paternity proceeding alleging that Olch was 
the father of her child. Olch disputed the allegations of 
paternity. In February of 1980, Olch and Dopp, individually 
and Mas guardian ad litem" for her child, entered into a 
stipulation for settlement which provided for a lump sum 
settlement of all claims as to paternity, expenses of 
pregnancy, any education and support expenses, inheritance 
rights and any claim otherwise related to the allegations of 
the pleadings or subject matter of the litigation. The 
settlement agreement contained an express disclaimer of 
paternity and a waiver of any rights to the child. Finally, 
the agreement contained the following language regarding 
disposition of the litigation: 
5. MBoth parties agree not to initiate 
any communications with the other party or 
members of their family." 
6. "The parties agree that upon the 
payment of the entire $16,500.00 and any 
accrued interest/ the above-entitled 
action shall be dismissed with prejudice 
and upon the merits, each party to bear 
his or her own costs." 
7. "This agreement is conditioned upon 
the approval of the court where the 
above-entitled action is pending and a 
dismissal with prejudice of said action,M 
The document also contained an "Order" which recited that the 
court approved the Agreement of Settlement/ and that the matter 
was continued without date. The Order further provided/ "The 
defendant shall submit to the court an Order of Dismissal upon 
final payment of the amounts referred to in the foregoing 
Agreement of Settlement." The Order was signed on February 19/ 
1980 and filed on the same date. 
On January 27# 1981/ Dopp's counsel filed a Satisfaction of 
Judgment acknowledging receipt of the settlement amount and 
authorizing and directing the court to enter satisfaction. 
Although not conforming with the express direction of the 
February 19/ 1980 Order to prepare an Order of Dismissal/ the 
Satisfaction of Judgment was clearly intended to culminate the 
paternity action. 
In or about June of 1987/ Olch caused an Order to Show 
Cause to be issued requiring Dopp to appear and show why she 
should not be held in contempt for initiating communication 
with Olch and his family. The court declined to hold Dopp in 
contempt/ but ordered that 
It was the intent of the parties that no 
communication be instigated between them 
or their families and the court now enters 
this Order that neither party shall 
communicate with the other or their 
families in any way/ whether such 
communication be written or verbal/ or 
through utilizing third parties. 
Dopp subsequently brought a Motion to Dismiss with 
Prejudice and in the alternative, a Motion to Amend Decree to 
allow for communication between the minor child/ Olch and his 
family. Both motions were denied. Dopp appeals, contending 
that the trial court erred in "sui sponte" entering an order of 
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no communication, in refusing to dismiss the case, in not 
amending the "decree" based on "changed circumstances", and in 
denying appellant attorney fees. 
The Utah Uniform Act on Paternity establishes that the 
father of a child born out of wedlock is liable to the same 
extent as the father of child born in wedlock "for the 
reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy and confinement 
and for the education, necessary support and funeral expenses 
of the child." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-l (1987). Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45a-2 (1987) prescribes the means for enforcement of 
the father's obligation "[i]f paternity has been determined or 
has been acknowledged according to the laws of this state.M 
"The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify or revoke a 
judgment for future education and necessary support." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45a-5 (1987). "An agreement of settlement with 
the alleged father is binding only when approved by the 
court." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-13 (1987). 
Dopp's first contention on appeal is that the trial court 
erred in "sui sponte" entering an order prohibiting her and her 
child from communicating with Olch and his family. This 
argument is wholly without merit. Dopp received notice of the 
hearing on the order to show cause, appeared at the hearing and 
was represented by counsel. The court declined to find Dopp in 
contempt, but reiterated the provision of the settlement 
approved by the court precluding communication between the 
parties or their families. 
Dopp next claims that the trial court erred in refusing to 
amend the "decree" based on "changed circumstances" consisting 
of the emotional problems of the child. This argument 
misconstrues the effect of the order of the court approving the 
settlement reached between Dopp and Olch. The Utah Uniform Act 
on Paternity provides for continuing jurisdiction to modify or 
revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. 
See Utah Code Ann. 78-45a-5. The threshold determination is 
whether the February 19, 1980 Order is a judgment susceptible 
of modification. The Order approves a lump sum settlement of a 
disputed paternity action between Dopp and Olch. The Order 
does not contain any provision for future support nor does it 
establish the paternity of the child. The Order is not a 
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judgment susceptible of modification under Utah Code Ann, 
§ 78-45a-5.1 
Dopp also appeals from the denial of an award of attorney 
fees to her. The Utah Uniform Act on Paternity contains no 
provision authorizing an award of attorneys fees in paternity 
actions. We can find no other basis for an award of attorney 
fees under the circumstances of this case and the appellant has 
indicated none. 
Finally, Dopp contends that the trial court erred in 
refusing to dismiss the case. The Stipulation for Settlement 
and the Order approving the settlement each provide that upon 
payment of the settlement amount, Olch shall cause the case to 
be dismissed with prejudice. Rather than prepare a dismissal, 
counsel for Olch prepared a Satisfaction of Judgment, with the 
apparent intention to culminate the litigation between the 
parties insofar as the financial aspects of the settlement 
1. We do not have before us in this case the issue of whether 
the parties could validly waive the child's right to support, 
and we, therefore, decline to rule upon the effect of an order 
approving a settlement of the support rights of the minor 
child. The Utah Supreme Court ruled in Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 
417, 419 (1986), that the parents of a child could not, by 
agreement, waive that child's right to support. See also Reick 
v. Reick, 652 P.2d 916, 917 (Utah 1982); Strong v. Strong, 548 
P.2d 626, 627-28 (Utah 1976). Our determination does not 
require a resolution of that issue. Instead, our holding that 
the present Order does not invoke the trial court's continuing 
jurisdiction is based on the literal terms of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45a-5 providing that continuing jurisdiction is dependent 
upon the existence of a judgment for future support. Similarly, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-2, referring to enforcement of the 
liabilities of the father of a child born out of wedlock, 
requires a determination that a parental relationship exists 
under the laws of this state. The February 1980 order approving 
the settlement satisfies neither of those prerequisites. The 
Order makes no determination of paternity and contains no 
judgment for future support. Similarly, although Dopp 
purportedly entered the settlement as guardian ad litem of her 
child, this Court does not have before it and makes no 
determination of the effect of the order on any future action by 
or on behalf of the child to adjudicate paternity and establish 
the right to support. 
870572-CA 4 
between Dopp and Olch are concerned. Appellants motion before 
the trial court sought relief in the alternative: either an 
order dismissing the case with prejudice or an order amending 
the "decree" to modify the non-communication provision. The 
strategy suggests that Dopp believes the dismissal of the case 
would nullify the non-communication agreement. That contention 
is erroneous. The settlement/ having been approved by the 
trial court, is binding upon the parties and the 
non-communication clause is subject to enforcement by the trial 
court. Dismissal of the case, although contemplated by the 
February 1980 Order, would not relieve Dopp and Olch of the 
requirements of their settlement, particularly where Olch has 
paid the amount set forth in the agreement. 
The Order of the trial court is affirmed. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of January, 1988, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was mailed to each 
of the following: 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Appellant 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Robert Felton 
Attorney at Law 
5 Triad Center, Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
HON. James S. Sawaya 
Third District Court 
Salt Lake County 
Civil No. C-78-6634 
Ju^ Tia C.\ WfiTtfield 
Cas4 Management Clerk 
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Robert Felton, 1056 
5 .Triad Center, Suite>585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Phone: (801) 359-9216 >i -— 
KATHY ANN DOPP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JONATHAN OLCH, 
Defendant. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL. DISTRICT COURT IN AND POR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
) 
) 
) 
) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
) 
) 
) C i v i l No. C78-6634 
) 
) 
* * * * * * * * * 
D
 ? 9) 
*» Sn 
& 
'-W+s 
in o 
CO _ 
Q lb < 
TO: Kathy Ann Dopp 
You are hereby ordered and required to appear before+the 
Honorable Cfi**^ S: 5*Ar*y\% Judge of the above-entitled court at 
a Pv+JU 
240 East 4th South* Salt Lake City. Utah on tfie / $/- day of *M*y, 
1987 at the hour of l,Vd p./*\ o'clock then and there to show 
cause why you should not be found In contempt of this Court for 
violating the Order entered on or about February 19, 1980 
demanding that you not contact the Defendant or members of his 
family. 
You are also further required to appear and show cause why 
you should not be ordered to assume and pay the Defendant's legal 
fees for the prosecution of this action and why this court should 
not take the other action requested In the Verified Motion filed 
by the Defendant, including the posting of a bond to ensure 
future compliance with this Court's Order* 
DATED this HT day of rUffisg-y, 1987. 
Serve the Defendant at: 
urt: frS 
*s*>* 
i 
3 
(FILMtiOi 
T B l ? ^ 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
E. Scott Savage 
Attorneys for Defendant 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SfATE OF UTAH 
KATHY ANNE DOPP, 
Plaintiff, 
- vs -
JONATHAN OLCH, 
Defendant. 
AGREEMENf OF SETTLEMENT AND 
ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT 
C i v i l No. C-78-6634 
A G R E E M E N T 
The defendant, Jonathan Olch, and the plaintiff, Kathy 
Anne Dopp, in her own behalf and as guardian ad litem for her 
minor child, Alister Fox Dopp, subject to court approval stipulate 
and agree to settle the above-entitled matter upon the following 
terms: 
1. The plaintiff in her own behalf and as guardian ad 
litem of her minor child, Alister Fox Dopp, hereby releases and 
forever discharges the defendant of and from any and all claims, 
demands, causes of action, damages, actions, suits of law, costs 
or expenses of any kind on account of, resulting from, or in any 
manner related to (1) any actual or alleged pregnancy confinement, 
hospital or medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff, (2) any 
education expense, support obligation or inheritance right of 
Alister Fox Dopp, or (3) any claim as to the paternity of Alister 
Fox Dopp, or (4) any claim otherwise related to the allegations of 
the pleadings or the subject matter of the above-entitled 
LAW of n e t s or 
VAN COTT, BAOLEY, CORNWALL ft MCCARTHY 
•utrc soo i4i KAST r m r r • O U T M 
• A L T L A K l CITY. UTAH •4111 
litigation. 
2. The defendant agrees to pay the sum of SIXTEEN 
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED and No/100 DOLLARS ($16r500.00). Said sum 
is to be paid as follows: 
At least FIVE THOUSAND and No/100 DOLLARS 
($5,000.00) is to be paid on or before February 10, 1980. On 
or before the twentieth day of each month thereafter, the 
defendant shall pay at least ONE THOUSAND and No/100 DOLLARS 
($1,000.00), or the balance of the amount remaining to be 
paid, whichever is the lesser sum, until the entire SIXTEEN 
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED and No/100 DOLLARS ($16,500.00) and 
accrued interest is paid in full. The plaintiff shall receive 
interest on any amount of the $16,500.00 not paid as of 
February 11, 1980, at the prevailing rate of interest paid by 
banks in Salt Lake County for money market certificates on 
said date. All interest shall be simple interest, computed 
but not compounded monthly on only the unpaid balance of the 
$16,500.00. All sums paid shall be applied first to reduce 
the principal and only after $16,500.00 has been paid shall 
any amount paid be applied to reduce accrued interest. 
Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit or penalize the 
early payment of the $16,500.00, or any portion thereof. 
3. All sums paid by the defendant to the plaintiff 
pursuant to the terms of this agreement, except for the first 
$2,500.00, shall be placed in trust, and the income and principal 
of said trust shalL only be used for the education, support or 
other benefit of Alister Fox Dopp. 
4. The parties acknowledge that this settlement agree-
ment is a compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim and that the 
said payment received by the plaintiff is not to be construed as 
2 -
an admission of liability of the defendant, who expressly denies 
any liability to either the plaintiff or Mister Fox Dopp. The 
defendant denies that he is the father of Alister Fox Dopp and 
denies that he had or has any rights with respect to said child. 
If defendant had or has any rights with respect to said child, he 
'I 
j hereby waives them, including the right, if any, to consent to 
P adoption. 
I 
, 5. Both parties agree not to initiate any communica-
i 
tions with the other party or members of their family. 
6. The parties agree that upon the payment of the en-
tire $16,500.00 and any accrued interest, the above-entitled 
action shall be dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits, each 
party to bear his or her own costs. 
7, This agreement is conditioned upon the approval of 
L the court where the above-entitled action is pending and a dis-
missal with prejudice of said action. 
DATED this /? ^ — day of February, 1980. 
KATHY ANME DOPP, jrt^ividu- /j JONATHAN OLCH 
ally any as Guardian Ad ^ 
Litem for Alister Fox Dopp 
O R D E R 
The Court, having read the foregding Agreement of 
Settlement, and being advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. The foregoing Agreement of Settlement is hereby 
approved. 
2. This matter is stricken from the trial calendar and 
continued without date. 
3. The defendant shall submit to the Court an Order of 
Dismissal upon final payment of the amounts referred to in the 
foregoing Agreement of Settlement. 
DATED this / *7 day of February, 1980. 
BY THE COURT: 
C D: 
*~AAS 
EAN E. CONDER 
District Court Judge 
w
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ff. £• i?arc 
DART & STEGALL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4 30 Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE) COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-—oooOooo—-
KATHY ANNE DOPP, i 
Plaintiff, * SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT 
V. i 
JONATHAN OLCH, j Civil No. C-78-6634 
Defendant. : 
— - O O O O Q O O 
Acknowledging receipt of $16,500.00 in full and 
complete satisfaction of the judgment heretofore entered in 
the above-entitled action, B. L. Dart, attorney for plaintiff, 
hereby authorizes and directs the clerk of the above court to 
enter such full and complete Satisfaction accordingly. 
DATED this /' ' day
 Qf January, 19 81. 
•V / 
t 
/? 
IS'*'/ 
1 1 
/ 
Syr 
By 
B. L. Dart 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
0n tne
 ^1 d a v o f January, 19 81, personally appeared 
before me B.L. Dart, and did acknowledge that he was the attorney 
of record for the above-named plaintiff and that he executed 
the foregoing. 
Notary Public ' 
Commission Expires: Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
Cyt H 
(\f>pt+ " 
Robert Felton, 1056 
5 Triad Center 
Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Phone: (801) 359-9216 
Attorney for Defendant 
tail 
/ *z 
# 
SiiYiw 
U 11 IOSLWPW 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND F O R W P W Y t l ^ l 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHY ANN DOPP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JONATHAN OLCH, 
Defendant. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * * * * 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
* * * * * 
ORDER 
C^vil No. C-786634 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable James 
S. Sawaya, Judge of the above-entitled Couxtt on June 29, 1987 
pursuant to the Order to Show Cause filed by the Defendant. 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file herein and 
for good cause appearing now enters this Order as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is not in contempt of this Court, 
2. It was the intent of the parties that no communication 
be instigated between them or their families and the Court now 
enters this Order that neither party shall communicate with the 
other or their families in any way, whether such communication be 
written or verbal, or through utilizing third parties. 
DATED this ' ^ ' day of J^TO^fry, 198^. 
By thesauri 
s 
/ 
Jameji'/S. Sawaya, J-cfdge 
' ATTEST 
H. DVAOU HtMuLEY 
Chi* 
Dowfty Clark 
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SUPREME COURT 78-2-2 
(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except for the following matters: 
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective January 1, 
1988]. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except for the following matters: 
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions; 
7 
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(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, 
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303. 
Amended effective January 1, 1988. — 
Laws 1987, ch 161, § 303 amends this section 
effective January 1, 1988 See catch! me 
"Amendment Notes," below 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch 47, § 41 repeals former § 78-2-2, as enacted 
by Laws 1951, ch 58, § 1, relating to original 
appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, and 
enacts the above section 
Amendment Notes. —- The 1987 amend-
ment, effective January 1,1988, added Subsec-
tion (6). 
Cross-References. — Appeals from juve-
nile courts, § 78-3a-51. 
Appeals in cnminal cases, U R Cr P 26 
ANALYSIS 
In general 
Appellate jurisdiction 
— Probate orders. 
Certiorari 
Original jurisdiction 
—Equity 
—Extraordinary writs 
Reheanngs 
—District judge filling vacancy 
—Newly elected justice 
Scope of review 
In general. 
Supreme Court is exclusive judge of its own 
jurisdiction National Bank v Lewis, 13 Utah 
507, 45 P 890 (1896) 
The Supreme Court is not a court of general 
onginal jurisdiction, it is a reviewing court 
Nielsen v Utah Nat'l Bank, 40 Utah 95,120 P 
211 (1911) 
Supreme Court can inquire into its own ju-
risdiction no matter how that question is called 
to its attention and regardless of whether par-
Certiorari, Utah Const., Art Vm, Sec. 4; 
U R C P 65B 
Chief justice to preside over impeachment of 
governor, § 77-6-3 
Election contest appeals, §§ 20-3-35, 
20-15-14 
Extraordinary writs, U R C P 65B 
Industrial commission orders, review of, 
§ 35-1-36 
Jurisdiction, Utah Const, Art VIII, Sec 3. 
Public service commission orders, exclusive 
junsdiction to review, §§ 54-7-16 to 54-7-18 
State bar, promulgation of rules, review of 
disciplinary orders, §§ 78-51-14, 78-51-19 
Unemployment compensation decisions, re-
view of, § 35-4-10 
ties desire it to do so Woldberg v Industnal 
Comm'n, 74 Utah 309, 279 P 609 (1929) 
Question of Supreme Court's jurisdiction to 
hear and determine an appeal is one that can 
be raised by the court on its own motion City 
of Logan City v Blotter, 75 Utah 272, 284 P. 
333 (1929) 
Appellate jurisdiction. 
—Probate orders. 
Final orders in probate were appealable un-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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CHAPTER 23 
UTAH EXEMPTIONS ACT 
Section Section 
78-23-1. Short title. 
78-23-2. Definitions. 
78-23-3. Homestead exemption -— Excepted 78-23-9. 
obligations — "Head of family" 
defined — Water rights and in-
terests — Conveyance of home-
stead — Married homestead 
claimant — Sale and disposi- 78-23-10. 
tion of homestead. 
78-23-4. Declaration of homestead — Filing 78-23-11. 
— Contents — Failure to file — 
Conveyance by married person 
— No execution sale if bid less 78-23-12. 
than exemption — Redemption 
rights of judgment creditor. 
78-23-5. Property exempt from execution. 78-23-13. 
78-23-6. Property exempt from execution to 
extent necessary for support. 
78-23-7. Exemption of unmatured life insur-
ance contracts. 78-23-14. 
78-23-8. Exempt property up to aggregate 
value of $500 — Exemption of 78-23-15. 
implements, professional books, 
tools, motor vehicle up to 
$1,500. 
Exemption of proceeds from prop-
erty sold, taken by condemna-
tion, lost, damaged, or de-
stroyed — Tracing exempt 
property and proceeds. 
Allowable claims against exempt 
property. 
Waiver of exemptions in favor of 
unsecured creditor unenforce-
able. 
Exertion of individual's rights by 
spouse, dependent or other au-
thorized person. 
Injunctive relief, damages, or both 
allowed against creditor to pre-
vent violation of chapter — 
Costs and attorney's fees. 
Property held by joint tenants or 
tenants in common. 
Exemption provisions applicable in 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
78-23-1- Short title. 
This chapter shall be known and may be i^ted as the "Utah Exemptions 
Act." 
History: C. 1953, 78-23-1, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. I l l , § 1. 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1981, 
ch. I l l , § 1 repealed former § 78-23-1 (L. 
1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-23-1; L. 
1969, ch. 18, § 9.103(2)(c)), relating to property 
exempt from execution, and enacted present 
§ 78-23-1. 
Cross-References. — County property, 
§ 17-15-13. 
Firemen's Retirement Act, benefits exempt, 
§ 49-6a-36. 
Governmental Immunity Act, execution not 
to issue against governmental entity, 
§ 63-30-22. 
Housing authority's property exempt, obli-
gees excepted, waiver, § 55-18-23. 
Judges' Retirement Act, payments and con-
tributions exempt, § 49-7a-33. 
Mechanics' liens, building materials not sub-
ject to execution except for purchase money, 
§ 38-1-23. 
Military property exempt, § 39-1-47. 
Military property wrongfully used, fines, 
§ 39-1-48. 
Occupational Disease Disability Law, § 35-
2-35. 
Partner's interest not subject to execution 
except on claim against partnership, § 48-1-22. 
Public aid for dependent mothers exempt, 
§ 17-13-9. 
Public assistance payments, § 55-15-32. 
Public Safety Retirement Act, § 49-11-43. 
Public transit district property, § 11-20-57. 
Salaries of public officials and employees, 
§ 78-27-15. 
School board property, § 53-4-12. 
School employees' retirement benefits, 
§§ 53-29-46, 53-29-56. 
State Retirement Act, § 49-10-48. 
Unemployment compensation, § 35-4-18. 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, §§ 70C-1-
101 et seq., 70C-7-101 et seq. 
Workmen's compensation, § 35-1-80. 
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78-27-54. Inherent risks of skiing — Trail boards listing 
inherent risks and limitations on liability. 
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more prominent locations 
within each ski area which shall include a list of the inherent risks of skiing, 
and the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as defined in this act. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 4. 
Meaning of "this act". — See note follow-
ing same catchhne in notes to § 78-27-51. 
78-27-55. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 78-27-55 (L 1979, ch. skiing and the statute of limitations on such 
166, § 5), relating to notice requirements in action, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 43, § 1. 
case of injury arising from the inherent risks of 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or de-
fense in bad faith. 
In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by statute or agreement, the 
court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
"Without merit" and "good faith." that it is appropriate, and as long as there is no 
A frivolous action having no basis in law or intent to hinder, delay, defraud or take advan-
fact is "without merit," but is nevertheless in tage of another Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 
"good faith" as long as there is an honest belief (Utah 1983). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in Attorneys' fees as recoverable in fraud ac-
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553 tion, 44 A L R 4th 776. 
Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Mentless Ac- Attorneys' fees obduracy as basis for state-
tions, 1984 Utah L Rev 593 court award, 49 A L R 4 t h 825 
A.L.R. — Construction and application of Award of counsel fees to prevailing party 
state statute or rule subjecting party making
 hase^ o n adversary's bad faith, obduracy, or 
untrue allegations or denials to payment of
 o t h e r m i s c o nduct , 31 A.L R. Fed. 833. 
costs or attorneys' fees, 68 A.L R 3d 209. 
78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees — Reciprocal rights to recover 
attorney's fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in 
a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory 
note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney's fees. 
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